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Abstract
Technology licensing and transfer is subject to problems of asymmetric information 
including moral hazard. This study explores the effects of informal governance, 
knowledge tacitness, and organizational receptivity on the preference of variable 
royalty scheme in the context of technology licensing. Drawing on the classic principal-
agent model, we assume that the variable royalty scheme is a process-based contract 
where the licensee is the principal and the licensor is the agent. The results show 
that informal governance facilitating goal alignment is positively associated with the 
variable royalty scheme (i.e. the process-based contract). Organizational receptivity 
promotes the legitimacy to imposing routines, evaluating the technology, and forming 
expectation, and is positively associated with the variable royalty scheme. Knowledge 
tacitness is negatively associated with the variable royalty payment, which implies 
less transfer programmability moves payment from variable royalties to a fixed fee. 
Our arguments are significantly different from classic principal-agent relationship 
that does not involve the dimension of licensee transfer and monitoring capacity.
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INTRODUCTION
The buyer-supplier relationship studies in the principal-agent model assume that (1) the principal and the agent sign a compensation contract; (2) the agent chooses an action, but the principal cannot observe this 
choice; (3) the action determines the agent’s output; and (4) the agent receives 
the compensation specified by the contract (Gibsons, 2005; Obloj and 
Zemsky, 2015). The technology licensing and transfer is one scenario of the 
buyer-supplier relationship. Technology licensing refers to the transfer of the 
right of using proprietary product, production, or managerial technologies by 
collecting a fixed fee (abbreviated as a fee) or variable royalties (abbreviated 
as royalties) in return from the licensor to the licensee (Contractor, 1981). The 
licensee is the technology buyer and the licensor is the technology supplier. 
Technology transfer, the most crucial part in the form of technology licensing 
contract transfer, relates to the process that the licensor assists the licensee in 
incorporating the technology with recipient operations (Rogers, 2002). In other 
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pay a fee or royalties to the licensor. In other words, the licensor is the agent 
who receives the compensation specified by the contract and determines the 
quality of technology transfer (Gibsons, 2005; Obloj and Zemsky, 2015; 
Sharma, 1997). 
Technological knowledge transfer is to problems of asymmetric 
information including moral hazard (Poblete and Spulber, 2014). Prior 
literature points out that the efficiency and information asymmetry are 
main reasons for choosing between a fee and royalties. The studies on the 
efficiency put more emphasis on a fee because it avoids the difficulty of output 
verification and the non-contractual uses of technology. Royalties increase 
the marginal cost to the licensee using the new technology and consequently 
decrease the total amount that the licensee is willing to pay (Kamien and 
Tauman, 1986). Information asymmetry is also important because royalties 
are offered to signal a high value for the technology (Gallini and Wright, 
1990) and to induce the licensor’s involvement (Aulakh, Cavusgil, and 
Sarkar, 1998). However, the considerations of efficiency and information 
asymmetry do not guarantee the transfer smoothly and successfully because 
technology transfer is costly. 
The licensor-licensee link can be viewed as an principal-agent 
relationship as the licensee attempts to gain accurate technological 
information and desired benefits from technology licensors (Bergen et al., 
1992; Bessy and Brousseau, 1998; Obloj and Zemsky, 2015). If (1) the 
relationship is supported by transaction or relationship specific investments, 
(2) the licensee’s knowledge frequently becomes obsolete due to rapid 
change, and/or (3) as the licensor’s technology of the interest makes the 
relationship irreplaceable or replace at a cost for the licensee, the licensor 
may be tempted to seek self-interest in the forms of moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and/or imperfect commitment (Obloj and Zemsky, 2015; Ouchi, 
1979; Sharma, 1997). Since moral hazard is fully recognized as an important 
obstacle for licensing through arm’s length contract, the contractual focus 
becomes should the payment be on the basis of a fee, royalties, or a hybrid 
(Contractor, 1981).
In this study, we attempt to document the payment scheme of technology 
transfer through licensing in principal-agent relationship. The next section 
presents the theoretical background of principal-agent model and plural 
governance in the context of technology transfer through licensing, and the 
hypothesis. The subsequent section presents the research methods, followed 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
Royalties Imply a Process-based Contract in Principal-agent Relationship
The focus of principal-agent model is to choose the efficient agency cost given 
to the human and information assumptions (Eisenhardt, 1989). A process 
based contract is more efficient when the cost of information is less than the 
cost of transfer risk. Conversely, an outcome-based contract is more efficient 
when the cost of information is lower. The principal offers an outcome-based 
contract when the agent payment is evaluated on the basis of actual outcomes 
that relate to reliance on objective measures and relatively little managerial 
involvement. On the contrary, the principal may offer a process-based contract 
when the principal directly evaluates that whether the agent’s actual activities 
comply with the pre-specified processes. Assumption underlying a process-
based contract is avoidance of moral hazard arising from both the hidden 
action and information (Arrow, 1985; Bergen et al., 1992). 
The above elaboration is from the principal perspective assuming that the 
principal knows how the agent does a job and so drives the exchange, but the 
principal does not know what the agent does. However, Sharma (1997) points 
out the assumption behind that the principal knows how to do is problematic. 
The task per se matters. When the principal seeks out the agent for his expert 
knowledge, and when there are the professional agent and the lay principal, 
or when the principal is the first time to delegate technology development, it 
is likely that the principal cannot specify the task goals or cannot design the 
appropriate contract, since expert power asymmetry favors the agent (Sharma, 
1997). 
Under a fee, the licensee pays the licensor an upfront fee (initial payment) 
at the onset of the contract, followed by the technology transfer, and then final 
payments. The licensor prefers to a fee because he may reduce the possible 
damage once the licensee terminates the contracts after access to the disclosed 
information and proceeds on his own. The benefit of a fee is avoiding the 
difficulty of verifying the licensee’s output and the non-contractual uses of 
the technology (Kamien and Tauman, 1986). However, the licensee bears the 
performance risk, once no final product can be produced and sold. Therefore, 
the exchange risk perceived by the licensee is the greatest among all payment 
structures. 
Royalties do not specify total price that makes payments a function of 
the value, generated by the successful commercialization of the transferred 
technology. Once no final product is produced and sold, the licensor cannot 
get any return from his effort, thus spreading the risk between two parties and 
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with the revenue of the licensor, but both parties have to afford subsequently 
monitor, communication, and enforcement costs at maintaining a continuous 
contract is invested (Aulakh et al., 1998). 
Recalled from the previous discussion, technology transfer through 
licensing for a technology learner involves managerial involvement in transfer 
activities and resource committed in monitoring how transfer is performed 
in the local context. Compared to an outcome-based contract, a process-
based contract entails greater supervision and tends to have a longer time 
perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989). To thoroughly learn the knowledge of the 
interest, a process-based contract requires the licensee to invest greater time 
and effort in monitoring how technology transfer is performed. Alternatively, 
royalties signal the value of the technology that the licensor sacrifices the 
short-term return in exchange for the long-term profit and then minimizes the 
exchange risks perceived by the licensee (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Helm and 
Kloyer, 2004). Hence, royalties implies a process-based contract in this study. 
An exception is that a process-based contract shifts the payment risks to the 
licensee but royalties spread the risk between the licensor and the licensee. 
Informal Governance
Informal governance corresponds to prior link and relational satisfaction that 
makes inter-organizational relationships which become more embedded into 
economic and social context over time and is idiosyncratic to the exchange 
relationships (Dekker, 2004). Firms with exchange relationships are adept to 
manage the contracting relationships in that contractual refinement promotes 
more cooperative and long-term exchange relationship. When the technology 
of interest involves with the private information held more by the licensor, 
the licensor and licensee, in response to keep-on-with-it define remedies for 
foreseeable contingencies or specify processes for resolving unforeseeable 
outcomes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Recall from the previous discussion 
that royalties involve periodic written reports, prompt written notice of any 
departures from the contract, examining and auditing all relevant records in 
relation to transferred knowledge. Accordingly, we predict the relationship 
between informal governance and royalty payments is positive.
Hypothesis 1: Informal governance is positively associated with the more 
proportional use of royalties.
Knowledge Tacitness
Knowledge tacitness is context-specific that the licensor is not fully aware of 
the details of the performance and finds it difficult or impossible to articulate a 
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whether articulated or not, may not know how to use the articulated knowledge. 
The transfer of tacit technology is more difficult to accomplish than the transfer 
of articulated knowledge under the circumstances of interorganizational 
technology transfer (Kogut and Zander, 1993). The more tacit the technology 
is, the more stock of technological knowledge the licensor is and the more 
expertise asymmetry exists between the two parties. The licensee offers 
royalties to ask for the thorough transfer. Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Knowledge tacitness is positively associated with the more 
proportional use of royalties.
Organizational Receptivity
In this study, organizational receptivity corresponds to the assertiveness of its 
learning intent and capacity. Hamel (1991) defines organizational receptivity 
as a partner’s learning capacity or absorptiveness. Larsson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson, and Sparks (1998) modify Hamel’s definition and redefine it as 
the intent and capacity to absorb the disclosed knowledge. We follow Larsson 
et al.’s (1998) definition in this research and propose that a highly receptive 
learning licensee enacts internal routines or organizational processes to solve 
informational asymmetry and risk-bearing problems and to enhance a firm’s 
technological competitiveness. 
Intelligence gathering signals the licensee’s intent to learn codified 
knowledge. When the licensee embeds the identification and assimilation of 
codified knowledge in operational routines, its receptivity to technological 
learning is proactive. Proactively searching patent data and scientific literature 
to identify the state of the external art provides the licensee with architectural 
knowledge, which enables him to directly assess the characteristics of 
technological technology, and then the information asymmetry ex ante is 
reduced. After assimilating the gathered intelligence, the expertise enables the 
licensee to earn the legitimacy to design meaningful monitoring systems and/
or set up relevant measurement standards to assess the transfer process, and 
reduces the need of investment in excessive information systems to monitor 
the licensor’s transfer activities. Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3a: Intelligence gathering is positively associated with the more 
proportional use of royalties. 
Transferring in knowledge does not automatically lead to acquisition of 
technological capability. Articulated technical data cannot capture all of the 
knowledge necessary to practice the technology. Much of the knowledge 
possessed by the licensor may be experiential. The licensee must invest its 
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technology. Stated differently, the licensee has to develop adequate internal 
technological capability because greater internal capability is typically 
associated with greater ability to take advantage of external technology 
(Veugelears and Cassiman, 1999). The accumulated, path-dependent, and 
internal capability contributes to the development of absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). If the licensee fails to learn from the licensor 
with sufficient absorptive capacity, the application of the new technology with 
royalties is unsatisfactory to both parties. On the other hand, the licensee’s 
absorptive capacity enables him to learn by interaction and then reduces 
the need to employ excessive monitoring mechanism to ensure contract 
effectiveness. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3b: Absorptive capacity is positively associated with the more 
proportional use of royalties. 
When there is substantial market overlap or product similarity, the licensee 
has more prior knowledge base to absorb the technological knowledge. The 
knowledge base promotes the likelihood of the commercialization of the 
knowledge. However, the licensor has temptations for not actually transferring 
all the promised know-how and marketing support necessary for the licensee to 
effectively integrate the technology into its operations, because it is costly and 
risky (Arora, 1995), once the price is paid. Under royalties, complementarily 
marketing knowledge of the licensee may tempt the licensor restraining from 
his shirking and transferring all the knowledge that facilitates the monetary 
return of the technology. Moreover, royalties signal the licensee not imitating 
or competing in similar product/geographic markets (Gallini and Wright, 
1990). Therefore, under royalties firms operate in similar markets and supply 
chains may scrutinize with more confidence in their partner’s opportunistic 
behavior (Kim, 2009). Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3c: Knowledge proximity is positively associated with the more 
proportional use of royalties.
METHODS
Data
The empirical study employed a questionnaire approach designed to collect 
data for testing the validity of the model and research hypotheses. Six 
hundred questionnaires were mailed to collected name-pools of Taiwanese 
manufacturing sectors that have in-house R&D staffs. The unit of analysis 
is the contract. If there was more than one technology transfer project for 
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one. Two weeks after the initial mailing, a follow-up mailing was sent out 
with a duplicate copy of the questionnaire and a return envelope. Of the 133 
questionnaires returned, seven responses reported that they did not have 
any technology transfer case and twenty-two were incomplete. 104 usable 
questionnaires were received, resulting in an effective response rate of 21%. 
Measures
Most measures for key constructs were derived from existing studies in the 
literature and adapted them to the context of the present study. This study used 
a fee versus royalties in accordance with the existing literature (e.g. Bousquet 
et al., 1998). Because a mixture of the two schemes is common and most 
contracts are not clustered into dichotomous categories (Bessy and Brousseau, 
1998), the measurement of the payment scheme adopted is dispersed along a 
simplified continuum ranging from primarily a fee to primarily royalties, on a 
five-point scale that asks about the frequency (Bousquet et al., 1998). 
Most independent variables were measured with multiple items using five-
point Likert scales ranging from 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree. 
Table 1 summarizes the measurement items. Licensee reputation and relational 
satisfaction are operationalized as informal governance. The value of licensee 
reputation and relationship satisfaction is maximized through an ongoing 
relationship, rather than discrete transaction. Licensee reputation is a two-item 
scale measuring the licensee’s goodwill and the quality of fulfilling contracts 
(Das and Teng, 2001). Relational satisfaction is a two-item scale signifying 
the extent of cooperation satisfaction experienced by the licensee (Dyer, 
1997). Knowledge tacitness is assessed using a three-item scale that measures 
the extent of the relative difficulty of transferring and imitating the technology 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993). Intelligence gathering is a four-item scale indicating 
the extent that the recipient’s intelligent asset management facilitates transfer 
and learning (Winter, 2004). Absorptive capacity is a five-item scale signifying 
the recipient’s ability to value, assimilate, and commercially exploit its 
transferred knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Knowledge proximity is 
a three-item scale indicating the extent of market overlap or product similarity 
between a licensee and its licensor (Vishwasrao, 2007). 
This study includes six control variables. Source specificity is measured 
on a two-item scale signifying the extent to which alternative technology is 
available to the licensee (Heide and John, 1988). Technological and marketing 
dependence presents the licensee dependence where greater dependence on 
the licensor’s support signals the licensee in need of the licensor’s future 
support and enables the licensee to commit more resources in calling for 
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licensee’s assessment of the extent of dependence on the licensor for critical 
components, technically engineering and manufacturing service support. 
Marketing dependence is a three-item scale measuring the extent of marketing 
and after-sales support (Provan and Skinner, 1989). 
Japan source is measured with a dichotomous item, with 1 indicating 
technology from Japan, otherwise 0. Among all technological superior 
countries, Japan has a historically close tie with Taiwan as there existed fifty-
year colonial relationship between these two countries. Hence, Japanese 
licensors may keep long-term business relationships with Taiwanese licensee, 
expecting royalties. Licensee size is a two-item scale composed by the 
logarithm of annual sales and the logarithm of capital. Large firms are more 
risk neutral than small firms and have more cash resources and bargaining 
power to pay a fee (Cebrián, 2009; Vishwasrao, 2007). Contractual scope is a 
three-item scale measuring the exclusivity of licensing, the extent of technical 
training and support, and the scope of licensing (Cho, 1988). The scope and 
nature of licensing contracts influences the choice between a fee and royalties. 
Technology licensing comprises the legal use of technology and assistance in 
technological and management support (Contractor, 1981); hence, agreement-
specific factors influence the payment scheme in technology licensing (Cho, 
1988). The broader contractual scope is expectedly negative with royalties 
(Helm and Kloyer, 2004).







The extent of licensee goodwill 0.93
The extent of performing contracts 0.88
Relational satisfaction 0.90
The extent of fulfilling obligations among prior 
collaborations
0.93




Use of transferred knowledge needs to intgrate 
multiple knowledge
0.90
Specificity of critical material, parts/ compo-
nents, or production process
0.60
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The extent of providing patented information to 
relevant functional departments
0.54
The extent of patent search before R&D 0.89
The extent of understanding patent filing status of 
related technologies
0.98




The ability to understand and analyze new 
knowledge
0.81
The ability to modify or transform new knowledge 0.83
The ability to apply new knowledge to improve 
production efficiency
0.72
The ability to apply new knowledge to develop 
new product
0.68




The similarity of existing product lines between 
two parties
0.88
The overlap of existing markets between two 
parties
0.76
The similarity of newly-developed products 




The availability of alternative source of technolo-
gy after contracting
0.77




Critical technology of product design depends on 
sourcing
0.58












Production efficiency depends on sourcing 0.89
Marketing dependence 0.94
Market information depends on sourcing 0.88
Marketing skills depend on sourcing 0.96





The extent of exclusivity of licensing 0.78
The extent of technical and training support 0.69
The scope of technology licensing 0.78
Note: All factor loadings are significant at p< 0.01 based on bootstrapped standard 
errors.
Because bias in self-reported survey data is a potential threat to validity, some 
tests were conducted to check the validity of the survey data. Due to the single 
informant in each questionnaire, the study employed Harman’s one factor model 
to examine the potential common method bias. The principal component analysis 
generates 12 factors with Kaiser criteria (eigenvalues>1) that account for 73% 
of the total variance. Since a single factor does not emerge, common method 
variance is not a significant problem in the data (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). 
Second, we examine two kinds of response bias in the data as suggested by 
Amstron and Overton (1977). The comparison of first-stage versus second-stage 
respondents in terms of capital and established year is employed to examine the 
early versus late responding bias. The comparison of firms that respond to this 
survey versus those do not but listed at the collected namepools in terms of the 
self-reported capital with the MOEA’s Commerce Industrial Services database 
is also employed to examine the responding versus non-responding bias. There 
is no statistically significant difference emerges from two student tests. The 
absence of differences can be consistent with the claim that response bias seems 
not to be a potential problem (Amstron and Overton, 1977).
DATA AND ANALYSIS  
Partial least square (PLS), a structural equation modeling technique employing 
a principal component analysis (Chin, 1998), was used to examine the 
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show that the composite reliabilities (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) of all 
measures are high and exceed the recommended threshold of 0.70, ranging 
between 0.76 (Knowledge tacitness) and 0.94 (Marketing dependence). 
The results suggest the measures provide internal consistency of scales. 
Second, convergent validity is assessed by the magnitude of the factor 
loading of each manifest indicator on its proposed construct. The average 
factor loading of Table 1 is 0.79, and all loadings are highly significant 
(all p’s < .01), showing that all indictors are effectively measuring their 
proposed constructs. Third, discriminant validity is evaluated by an average 
variance extracted (AVE) test (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). To support the 
discriminant validity of a construct, the AVE measure should be greater 
than the variance shared between the construct and other constructs in the 
model (i.e. the squared correlation between two constructs). As shown 
in Table 2, each AVE measure on the diagonal is greater than the off-
diagonal elements in the corresponding rows and columns, thus confirming 
the discriminant validity. Overall, the constructs demonstrate adequate 
measurement properties. 
Table 2: AVE Test of Discriminant Validity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11






0.00 0.00 0.52 
4. Intelligence   
gathering
0.09 0.00 0.02 0.58 
5. Absorptive capacity 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.58 
6. Knowledge 
proximity 
0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 








0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.84 
10. Licensee size 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.91
11. Contractual scope 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.57 
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Table 3 provides Pearson zero-order correlation matrix for all related vari-
ables. The highest correlation coefficient is between recipient intelligence gath-
ering and learning capability (r=0.44) indicating that there are no strongly cor-
related variables. The positive correlation between royalty scheme and licensee 
reputation, relational satisfaction, intelligence gathering, absorptive capacity, 
and knowledge proximity are consistent with our hypothesis. The negative cor-
relation between the royalties scheme and knowledge tacitness is contradictory 
to our expectation. Except contractual scope, the correlations between the royal-
ties scheme with the other five control variables are positive. This suggests that 
exclusivity of licensing, greater support and service, and greater scope of licens-
ing is negatively correlated with the royalties scheme; the greater the source 
specificity, technological and marketing dependence, Japan source, and recipient 
size, the higher the likelihood of more proportional royalties is, respectively. 
Table 3. Zero-order Correlation Matrix
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The study tested the hypothesis simultaneously using PLS, which has been 
widely applied in strategic management research (Hulland, 1999). PLS with boot-
strap estimates of standard errors was used due to the characteristics of our sample 
size and the non-normal distribution of the data. The models with 1000 bootstrap-
ping runs demonstrate good explanatory power, because the R_squared values for 
the constructs are ranging from 0.24 to 0.44.
Licensee reputation and relational satisfaction as proxy of informal govern-
ance have significantly positive effects on the royalty scheme. The results suggest 
the higher the recipient reputation is and the greater satisfaction is, the more likely 
the royalties scheme is to be adopted, supporting Hypothesis 1. This finding is con-
sistent to the classic agency theory that goal congruency is positively associated 
with a process-based contract (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Hypothesis 2 predicted knowledge tacitness that requires the licensor to 
interact closely and requires longer time to transfer knowledge would lead to the 
greater likelihood of a royalty scheme. Knowledge tacitness in the model has a 
negative effect on the royalty scheme, which is consistent with Bessy, Brousseau 
and Saussier (2008). Hypothesis 2 is not supported. One of the rationales maybe the 
incompetent licensee is vulnerable to contracting. Knowledge tacitness increases 
the expected transfer costs (Kogut and Zander, 1993). If the licensee opts for a 
royalty scheme, the licensor’s return for the technology will be reduced in addition 
to transfer costs. It is also less likely that the licensor provides more constructive 
suggestions to the licensee beyond the contract as transfer costs increase. The 
other reason is lack of technical expertise makes the licensee difficult to invest a 
commodity-type information system or to choose between the costs of outcome 
measurement and process observation (Sharma, 1997). Therefore, knowledge 
tacitness increases knowledge asymmetry and decreases the licensor’s willingness 
to collaborate. Hence, a fees scheme is preferred.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the likelihood of using more proportional 
royalties would be greater when the licensee has greater organizational receptivity. 
Intelligence gathering has a positive effect on the royalty scheme but is insignificant, 
not supporting Hypothesis 3a. The rationale behind this insignificance may be the 
major objective that catching-up firms in NIEs use intelligence gathering activities 
for infringement avoidance more rather than to acquire codified knowledge. 
Absorptive capacity and knowledge proximity have significantly positive effects 
on the royalty scheme, supporting Hypotheses 3b and 3c. 
All the control variables except licensee size have effects on the royalty 
scheme. The effects of source specificity, technological and marketing dependence 
on the royalty scheme are significantly positive. Japan source has a significantly 
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royalty scheme is more likely. It is possible that because Japanese and Taiwanese 
are long-term oriented, royalties imply continuing business relationships. 
Table 4: Regression Model
Model 1 Model 2
Licensee reputation 0.11 (2.449) *
Relational satisfaction 0.09 (1.979) *
Knowledge tacitness -0.28 (8.266) **
Intelligence gathering 0.10 (1.803)
Absorptive capacity 0.28 (6.253) **
Knowledge proximity 0.15 (3.871) **
Source specificity 0.16 (3.776) ** 0.19 (4.658) **
Technological dependence 0.28 (5.880) ** 0.27 (6.590) **
Marketing dependence 0.17 (3.431) ** 0.12 (3.326) **
Japan source 0.22 (5.352) ** 0.12 (2.701) **
Licensee size 0.05 (1.252) -0.07 (1.805)
Contractual scope -0.16 (2.972) ** -0.26 (4.852) **
R2 0.24 0.44 
Licensee size in this study is used as an aggregate indicator of sales and assets 
to test the effect of the licensee firm size. The effect of licensee size on the 
royalty scheme is insignificant in this study. This finding is inconsistent with 
the literature. Measured as the logarithm of capital of the Spanish recipient’s 
firm size, Cebrián (2009) demonstrates the larger the licensee is, the greater the 
likelihood it is to choose a fee relative to royalties. Using 765 Indian technology 
licenses, Vishwasrao (2007) finds that licensing contracts are more likely to use 
royalties when the licensee sale is relatively high, and less likely to use royalties 
when the licensee asset is relatively high. 
Contractual scope has significantly negative effects on the royalty scheme. 
The negative effect of contractual scope suggests that the greater exclusivity of 
licensing, extent of technical training and support, and scope of licensing are, the 
less likely the royalties scheme is, and the greater the likelihood of fee scheme is. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Whereas many multinational enterprises capitalize on licensing out to extract 
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few resources, more and more firms license in to supplement firms’ internal in-
novation processes and gain access to firm-specific resources (Tsai and Wang 
2009). The logic following the classic agency theory neglects the licensee 
learning motives and capacity. We contribute to the literature on contracting 
for technological knowledge transfer by explicitly examining the effects of 
informal governance, knowledge tacitness, and organizational receptivity on 
the payment scheme. This study examines the effects of informal governance, 
knowledge tacitness, and organizational receptivity on the payment scheme 
in the international technology licensing context. We proposed a simplified 
continuum of payment scheme, which then forms the basis for an empirical 
analysis of choice of payment scheme. The empirical results are from a survey 
of 104 technology licenses in Taiwan. 
From a theoretical perspective, the results extend existing principal-agent 
model. Firstly, the technology licensor-licensee link fits the principal-agent 
relationship. The technology licensee is considered as the principal who has a 
need of developing new technology but lacks of relevant resources to complete 
the task. The technology licensor is considered to be the agent who is hired 
to conduct technology development for the licensee. The licensor is mostly 
superior to the licensee in terms of either time lead in technology life cycle or 
in technological capabilities. Hence, the principal-agent relationships under 
the circumstances of international technology licensing are different from the 
power structure of the classic principal-agent model. 
Secondly, royalties approximate a process-based contract in this study be-
cause both are long-term oriented and require more managerial involvement. 
A process-based contract promotes the licensee /principal to engage in active 
involvement by committing more resources in collecting information. When 
the licensee/principal needs to employ the licensing to learn the externally new 
technology, he will make more relationship-specific investment in activating 
the learning and winning the licensor/agent’s support. Royalties enable the 
licensor/agent to make relationship-specific investment in return for successful 
commercialization of technology in the local context. 
Thirdly, according to the classic principal-agent model, the completion 
risk of a process-based contract is borne by the principal. But in licensing 
practices, royalties split the application risk between the licensor and licensee. 
One critical issue in designing the agency contract arises that is how the 
licensee/principal reduces the risk perceived by the licensor/agent. We then 
apply Sharma’s (1997) argument to reduce the licensee/principal’s perceived 
risk. The choice of payment scheme results from the difference in risk 
preferences of the licensee/principal and licensor/agent. As a complement to 
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contingencies or to specify processes for resolving unforeseeable events in 
licensing. Knowledge tacitness reduces the effectiveness of technology 
transfer, but organizational receptivity promotes the legitimacy to impose 
routines and decision rights and consequently enhances the licensee transfer 
and monitoring capacity. Our arguments are significantly different from classic 
principal-agent relationship that does not involve the dimension of licensee 
transfer and monitoring capacity.
Finally, organizational receptivity consisting of intelligence gathering, 
knowledge proximity, and absorptive capacity is the motivation and capacity 
of organizational learning that a firm accumulates his technological capability. 
Organizational receptivity is not only helpful for knowledge transfer but good 
to the principal-agent relationship. The elements pave the way not only for 
building architecture knowledge for assessing the technological knowledge 
of interest, but establishing information system to monitor how the transfer 
proceeds and to reduce the ambiguity of the technology transformation. 
Royalties become more feasible to the licensor as organizational receptivity 
increases and the application risk perceived reduces. 
Limitations and Outlook
This study has several limitations that should be addressed in future 
endeavors. Firstly, it investigates only a simplified payment scheme i.e. a fee, 
royalties, and a combination of these two, leaving other schemes unexplored. 
The determinants of payment scheme may differ depending on which 
licensing exists, such as cross-licensing, OEM/ODM, machinery/equipment 
procurement, joint ventures, ex post renegotiation, etc. Future research should 
examine various types of licensing along with the payment modes, as the 
factors associated with governance and capability may differ. New strategies 
and issues in moral hazard and power structure complicate the relationships, 
and more frameworks must be developed to study these emergent licensing 
settings. 
Secondly, we conjecture royalties approximate with a process-based 
contract whereby a fee versus royalty scheme and a process-based versus 
an outcome-based scheme disperse a continuum, respectively. We do not 
empirically test the relationship between these two types of contract: royalties 
versus process-based. As some studies operationalize a process-based and 
outcome-based scheme as distinct constructs (e.g. Gencturk and Aulakh, 
1995), further studies may examine the approximation.
Thirdly, technology licensing, especially patent licensing, comprises the 
proactive and reflective licensing. This study takes the proactive licensing into 
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not infringement involves more legal issue than internalization or substitution 
issue. 
Finally, the data is a small Taiwan’s ICT firms, which cannot generalize 
to other sectors in NIEs, but it suggests a reasonable starting point. Future 
research may extend similar inquiries to other national settings, incorporate 
industry-level parameters, and employ dyad analyses on before-contracting 
and after-contracting.
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